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1. The Promise and Crisis of Naturalism 
In the hundred years since his death, Wilhelm Dilthey's works have 
evoked contradictory receptions. Dilthey's epistemic project is to a large 
extent ))naturalizin芋， as his Neo-Kantian, phenomenological, and later 
hermeneutical criti口 have repeatedly noted. At the same time, it is 吨nt1-
naturalistic<< according to his positivistic and scÎentistic reception 
In this paper, 1 reexamine the mediated nexus of nature and spirit ar 
ticulated in Dilthey's works, particularly the writings of the 1890's that 
are closer to a naturalis!Íc and positivistic perspective without embracing 
it. 1 argue that Dilthey's project Îs more coherent than his naturalistÎc and 
antÎ-naturalistÎc critÎcs have supposed. Such a reconsideration of Dilthey's 
project offers an evocatÏve alternative strategy for responding to the op-
position between naturalism and anti-naturalism that continues to inforrn 
contemporary philosophy. 
Beginning with the naturalistic perspectÏve presupposed by and esta-
blished in the modern natural sciences, Dilthey immanently unfolds its 
scope, possibilities, and lirnits in relation to the psychological, historical, 
and ethical life 01 concrete embodied individuals. He does so without 
relying on essentialist religious or metaphysical conceptions of being, 
ideal validity, or an unchanging seH. Dilthey not only accepted the validity 
of the modern natural scienc白， he justified them by historically and 
anthropologically contextualizing them. N ature and history do not neces-
sarily indicate the elirnination of knowledge and truth; they are its con-
texts and conditions. Without these life-processes, and the emergence of 
the cognitive from the non-cognitive, there would be no science as a prac 
tÏce of knowing and enactment of truth 
In discussions of Dilthey's conception of science, Dilthey's attentÏon 
to the natura1 sciences is frequently underemphasized, even though 
Dilthey wrote extensively about the historical development and life-
comportment of the modern natural sciences. 1 In these writings, such as 
One example of this interest is Dilthey's attention to developments in the natural 
scÎences in his review essays gathered 皿 G.S. volumes XV二XVIL References to 
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his account of the constÌtutÌve role of StoÌcism in the development of 
臼rly modern natural philosophy, Dilthey helped pioneer the histoty of 
science as a philosophical undertaking2 Dilthey' s this-worldly and his-
torical justification of the sciences, and his corresponding transformatÏon 
of the modern project of epistemology, critically traced the extent and 
limits of scientific knowledge in the nexus or context of life (Leben 
szusammenhang) 
The epistemology of the sciences not only calls for its social-
historical contextualization; it also needs to be rethought in relation to i臼
psychological, anthropological, and natural conditions. In this context, 
human knowledge is faced with the felt self-relational reflexivity (Inne-
由盯den) of the self, the singular in出viduation of natural and historicallife 
in an individual life, and the inability of humans to fathom and compre-
hend the whole of life as an integrated metaphysical or universally valid 
system. The truth of the naturalistic worldview that orients natural scien-
tific inquiry has no limits in the continuing practice of the natural sci-
ences. However, the natural standpoint enters into aporia and crisis when 
it is illegitimately extended beyond i臼 life-contexts and reified 臼 a meta-
physical world-system independent of experience 
Dilthey naturalis tÏcally contextualized epistemic claims that involve 
an appeal to what transcends experience and the categories of life enacted 
through experience. At the same time, Dilthey hermeneutically rejected 
the naïve empiricism and intuitionism that require an appeal to a non-
interpreted immediate givenness. For Dilthey, there is no access to expe-
rience independent of the mediation of expression and understanding; the 
direct self-access 四d transparent self-evidence of an uninterpreted intui-
tlomst 叫nner experience<< or an unmediated em户口ClSt >>sensuous expe 
rience" prove to be illusoty. In contrast to vulgar life-philosophy and 
growing irrationalist appeals to a pure stream of 且fe without the media 
tion of words and concep臼， which Dilthey would challenge with a scien 
tific conception of life-philosophy for the sake of life that cannot live 
without knowledge, Dilthey noted how both concep臼 and intuitions are 
inappropriately separated from their life-contexts. Through the overex-
tension and abuse of reason and intuition, lived 白甲eriences are fixated 
Wilhelm Dilthey's works are to: Gesam附加 5chγiften ， 26 vols. Göttingen: Vanden 
hoeckιRuprecht， 1914一2011 (cited as G.5.); Engl凶 translatior盹 when available, 
are from R.A. Makkreel and F. Rodi (eds.): Wilhelm Dilthey, Selected Wo地s， 6 vols 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985-2010 (口ted 目 SW)
2 Such as the essays gathered in G.S. II; on the intellectual historical context of 
Dilthey's account of the transition to modern science and modernity, see L. Froh-
man, Neo-Stoicism and the Transiti拍坦 Modem町 ín Wílhelm Dílth呵's Philos呻hy
o[ HistoηJournal of the History of Ideas , 56: 2, 1995, 263•287 
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and dynamic life-perspectives become re出ed metaphysical world-pic 
tures 
Dilthey's defense of naturalism is a limited and conditional one to 
the extent that he critically resituated naturalistic claims vis-à-vis the sub-
ject in the experience. Dilthey's epistemic subject is a situated, experien-
tial, and ernbodied one vrithin the life-nexus. Insofar as it involves rnore 
than being an irnpersonal product of natural and social forces , thi四s expe盯n1 
e阳ntial s阳ub剧lec口t could well be desc口n口ib阮ed as invol扣Vl血ng a 
argument. Dilthey liberalizes the naturalistic thesis through the condi-
tional yet still significant self. Due to Dilthey's moderate nominalism and 
experientialism, Dilthey minimalistically reinterpreted Kantian a priori 
transcendental categori口 as conditionally enacted and contextual1y em-
bodied life-categories (Lebenskategorien). Dilthey consequently con-
fronted naturalism, as the exteriority of worldly causal relations, with the 
reflexively felt and interpretively mediated character of the phenomenally 
given and the factical in the lived-experiences of an individuallife that is 
experienced as being my own 
The experiential hermeneutical perspective of an individuallife can-
not disregard or escape the natural causal relations vrith which it is entan-
gled. This contingent seH, as the individuation of meaning in the rnidst of 
its natural and social conditions, cannot be coherently and adequately re-
duced to, or reconstructed as, a discrete set of >natural< elernents ab 
stracted from the complex life-nexus. In the co-givenness of self and 
world, spirit and nature, to be a seH is to have a world 叫here-for-m归. The 
world，臼 a relational nexus of signi自cance， pr时upposes 1臼 being句there for 
someone. The individual is ineffable from the perspective of the natural 
standpoint. It is the individual person as a living ethical reality that is the 
other defining feature of modernity and the prima巧1 focus of the human 
sciences in Dilthey' s historical analys坦
Despite the role of the ethical individual in the human sciences, natu 
ralism is the primary methodological orientation for all modern science 
Yet it is exposed to a dialectic that results in dogrnatic rnetaphysical theses 
and explosive aporias that force its liberalization. The naturalistic stand-
point is caught in perplexity and crisis in being extended to 巳thicallife and 
challenged with issues of value , purpose , and rneaning that it cannot ap-
propriately address. It is the contexts and contents of life 一副 the media 
tion of nature and spirit - that motivate the methodological differentia 
tion of the sciences and the articulation of reality in rnore complex and 
multifaceted ways 
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2. Dilthey and Naturalistic Positivism 
Dilthey's name is frequently invoked in Anglo-Arnerican contexts in con-
junction with the idea - articulated by c.P. Snow in the rnid-twentieth 
century - that the natural scienc臼 and hurnaniti巳s constitute two distinct 
cultures. Dilthey is understood as a radical dualist in this discussion and 
this rernains the predominant way of construing his dis tÌnction between 
interpretive understanding in the human sciences and causal explanation 
in the natural sciences. However, "WÎthin philosophical discourses, Dilthey 
has also been read as a proponent of the supremacy of one culture over 
the other. 
One way of reading Dilthey identifies the basic tendency of his 
thinking as being in some sense >naturalizing< and >positivistic<. Although 
this judgrnent rnight appear peculiar, Dilthey hirnself affirrned the farnily 
affinity between these two movernents - along with materialism - as de盼
velopmental variations of a cornrnon 咱atural standpoint<< or >>natural 
wor1dview<<. Dilthey not only noted their affinity with and resonance "WÎth 
one another but with his own critical empirical project that also begins 
with the fact of the modern natural sciences. Broadly construed, the natu-
ralistic standpoint encompasses a 部üding commitment to a non-super 
natural and scientific conception of the world. Naturalism is transforrned 
into natural scient出c positivism, according to Dilthe如 when the critical 
standpoint of the phenornenal character of the physical world is recog 
nized.3 The positivist turn in the modern natural sciences entails that 
naturalism and materialisrn as doctrinal metaphysical systems are illusory. 
Dilthey's later hermeneutical critics, Heidegger and Gadamer, have 
maintained the contÎnuity between Dilthey and scientism.4 日白degger
clairned that Dilthey's differentiation of two varieties of sciences, natural 
and human, remains a positivistic distinction. It is derivative of the rnore 
original question of being (Sein) as such and as a unified whole in contrast 
with the ontic investigation of beings as entities (Seiende). Gadarner 
rnaintaìned that Dilthey was trapped between the scientistic methodologi 
cally reductive conception of the world and the romantic experience of an 
affectively rnoved and felt vital individuality5 Because of bis affinity with 
3 Cf. G.S. V, 403 
4 On Dilthey and pos山vism， see H. Sommerfeld, Wilhelm Dilth可 und der Positivis 
mus: Eine Untersuchung zur ~Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften<. Berlin 
Buchdruckerei von J. Herper, 1926; H.-H. Gander expands on the 日αdegger
iDspired analysis of Dilthey's positivism as the culmination of metaphysics in his 
Positivismus als Me叩hysik: Voraussetzungen und Grundstrukturen von Diltheys 
Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften. Freiburg: Alber, 1988 
5 日ans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Methο d. London: Continuum, 2004, 214 
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positivism, Gadamer has stressed how Dilthey remained a student of 
Cornte and Mill as well as of Goethe and Schleierrnacher. This characteri 
zation of Dilthey rnakes little sense if 咀aturalistic positivism<< is defined 
in the limited sense of, in Benedetto Croce's words，叫he enerny of every-
thing spiritual and historical<<.6 An expanded and historically fairer exposi-
tion of positivism, one that allows us to productively and critically clarify 
Heidegger and Gadarner's portrayal of Dilthey, is that it is naturalistic and 
positivistic in the sense that it encompass田 (1) the critique of rneta 
physical conceptions of reality for the sake of encountering 阻d investi 
gating reality in its ernpirical givenness and phenornenality and (2) the 
epistemic priority of the methods, models, and results of the modern 
natural sciences 
In another variation on this line of criticism, one adopted by Walter 
Benjarnin and Theodor Adorno, it is argued that Dilthey did not over-
come the last residues of naturalistic biology and universalistic anthropol-
ogy by sufficiently historicizing and socializing human existence.7 This is 
intentional on Dilthey's part insofar as he opposed the one-sidedness of 
the historical school as rnuch as he did a 且mited reductive naturalism. In 
an early response to Dilthey's criticism of the notion of a folk soul 
(Volksseele) , or collective agency, Georg Sirnrnel contended that there are 
no real individuals for the same reasons that Dilthey argued there are no 
collective entities. The collective and the individual are equally constituted 
products of natural conditions and social forces. 8 Simmel proposed that 
this position, Dilthey is not directly named, was a positivism that incon 
sequentially stopped short in the face of the rnyth of the person.' 
3. Dilthey and Anti-Naturalism 
A second way of reading Dilthey has rnade his thought the target for pro 
ponents of the thorough naturalization of the human sciences and every 
day life. Dilthey appears as a rnajor antagonist of scient出c naturalisrn 
from Otto Neurath's polemical assessment to Chrysostomos Mantzavi-
6 B. Cr旧e: History as the S比 ry of Lib，叮 London: G. Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1941, 
129 
7 On Benjamin's reading of Dilthey's 啊îtings as an anthropologically based oppo-
n时en旧t of r阻ad副1臼叫1 h怡凶川tωon肌nCl叼 s盹e臼e B. H陆f妇an旧ssen， ，研防刷F目川i什1"优-er Be叫役呵7即耐刷n阳"阴旷削n的z扩白's Ot1.的"盯γ H历"盯〈σy.Off 
5归ne.盹5儿， An阳功nals， Hu附仰m阳?η，a叩tωW仰剧剧n Beωzngs， 耐and A乡η吨Z哩g'彷ls￥ Berkeley: U ni凹ve盯rs1t此盯可y of California 
Press, 2000, 53 
8 Compare the discussion of these points in L. Udehn: Me的odologicalIndividω lism 
Background, History and Meaning, 2001 , 68-74 
9 Ibid 
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nos's more recent book Naturalistic Hermeneutics. According to this ar-
gument, Dilthey cannot successfully prove that the human and natural 
sciences are discrete autonomous unities and that this th臼is dangerously 
undermines the unity, coherence, and integrity of the sciences. 10 Dilthey is 
read as placing inherent limi臼 on the progress of positive scientific 
knowledge and rejecting a naturalis tÏc conception of the world for one in 
habited by biographical persons, felt and conceptual motivations, social 
groups , cultural patterns , political institutions, and other mythical folk-
concep臼 Dilthey's differentiation of the human sciences consequently 
places them outside the realm of legitimate scientific inquiry. The ex-
panded notion of rationality and science promoted by Dilthey inevitably 
leads to irrationality and anti-science for these criti臼 This positivist criti 
cism is echoed in Marxist materialismj Lenin and Lukács described 
Dilthey and Weber's justification of interpretive understanding (verste-
hen) in the human sciences as a hig且er obscurantism and non-clerical 
form of idealism. 11 
There are earlier expressions of such SusplclOns concerning the 
meaning and implications of interpretive understanding, w也ich is the ele 
mentary stumbling block for Dilthey's science oriented commentators 
Theobald Ziegler in the late 19'h-century warned of a "dictatorial Ignor-
abimus<< (>>we will not know<<) that he proposed stemmed from Dilthey's 
interpretation of Augustine. Dilthey emphasized Augustine's articulation 
of an irrational subjective interiority and ineffable i口dividuality that can 
only be comprehended through an intuitive felt understanding. Such a 
feeling-to-feeling transmission between persons cannot be reproduced 
and thus endangers the objectivity and rationality of science. 
An interesting disagreernent concerning Dilthey's import for the sci-
ences is evident in the von Mises brothers. The economist of the Austrian 
school Ludwig von Mises accepted Dilthey's methodological individual-
ism and the incalculable character of life in the 1920's in his confrontation 
with Neurath's conception of socialist calculation. The logical positivist 
Richard von Mises maintained, however, that ignoramus et ignorabimu5 
the >>we do not know and wil1 not know<< that Emil Du Bois-Reymond in 
troduced in a lecture on August 14, 1872 - is a direct consequence of 
10 O. Neurath, SozioloJ.!je im P.炒51缸lismus (1931) in: M. Stoltzn矶时，而"阳岛四
Texte zur wissenschaftlichen 咽Teltauffassung. Hamburg: Meine鸟 2006， 285; C 
Mantzavin时 ， N aturalistic HI凹neneutics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2005 
11 On Dilthey and Marxist materialism, see K. Anderson, LeniJ飞 HegeZ， and Westen叼
Marχism: A Critical Study. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995, 184; T. 
Rockmore, lrrationalism: Lukács and the Marxist View 01 Reason , 1992, 212 
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Dilthey's differentiation of explanation (e地μren) and understanding 
(vers甜hen).12
Walter Pollack and Georg Misch argued against the claim that under-
standing the finitude and conditionality of cognitively established theo-
retical knowledge as entailing an obscurantist prohibition on further re 
search and inqui巧乙 13 If we turn to Dilthey's discussions of Du Bois 
Reymond's thesis, Dilthey actively rej巳cted the idea that there are intrin 
sic limits to scientific inquiry even as he argued that the sciences are d丘』
ferentiated and varied by their objects. 14 The unity of science 1S not to be 
dogmatically 且mited; it is differentiated through the multiplicity of the 
empirical world. Dilthey would consequent!y agree with Haeckel's critical 
reply to Du Bois-Reymond's Ignorabimus and Virchow's Restγ"mgamur 
Impavidi progrediamur (吨dvance fearlessly") , while disputing posit凹lS t1C
claims about the import and implications of the scienc臼 within ordinary 
everyday life. 
In an early Literaturbrief from 1876, Dilthey argues that Du Bo卧
Reymond's thesis is as unscientific as the dogmatic scientific materialism 
that it attempts to oppose. 15 The current configuration of the scope and 
limits of the sciences can and ""Will be redrawn. Crises and alternative hy-
potheses and theories recon直在ue the scope and limits of scientific 
knowledge. However, being disposed towards Hume' s argurnentation 
concerning what theory and scientific theory can achieve, and prefiguring 
Rudolf Carnap's distinction between science and ethics, Dì1they con-
cluded that there are no internallimits to science in i臼 own domain yet, 
even if every question could be scientifically resolved into natural laws , 
the riddles and tasks of practicallife would remain 
Jürgen Moltmann right!y argues that Dilthey did not advocate ob 
scurantlsm m r臼ponse to science and reason. Dilthey identified a scientis 
tic obscurantism in those who overlooked history, deluded that they alone 
possess truth independently of others. 16 Their ahistoricallack of vision re 
sembles the priestly princes of metaphysics 听ho refuse to acknowledge 
the constitutive role of the affective, the subjective, and the individual 
that are the conditions of both life and knowledge. No desires and senti-
12 R. von Mises, Positivism: A Study in Human Understanding. New York: Dover 
Publìcations , 1968, 209 
13 W Pollack, Ubeγ die philos叩hischen Grundl.唔"en der 切issenschaftlichen 且'orschung
Als Beitrag zu einer Methodenpolitik. Berlìn: F. Dümmler, 1907: 119; G. Misch, 
Vom Lebens一 und Gedankenkreis Wilhelm Dilth可s. Frankfurt a. Main: G. Schulte 
Bulmke, 1947, 49 
14 Pollack 1907, 119 
15 G.S. XVII, 5 
16 J. Moltmann, HI叩e and Planning. New York: Harper & Row, 1971 , 60 
147 
Eric S. Nelson 
ments run through the veins of their knowing subjects and so such sub-
jects are constitutively incapable not only of living but of knowing. The 
thesis that reason is grounded in sentiment and hîstoricallife îs of course 
another argument with precedents in Hume's phîlosophy of cornmon life. 
Misch maintained 出at Dilthey adopted the same phenomenalist epis 
temic basîs as the positivist advocates of the natural sciences, whilst rein 
terpretmg ltS slgn迁icance and implicat旧时. There can be in Dilthey no 
>>we will not know<< that 且mits processes of further intellectual develop向
rnentY There is instead only a reasonable recognition that we do not 
know in an absolute or royal way. This pluralist clairn cuts against both 
reductionistic naturalism and anti咀aturalism. Insofar as anti-naturalism 
assum田 a royal route to truth through intuition, dialectic, or phenome-
nology, it commits the same error as its opponents 18 
There are a number of readings suggestive of an aIternative concep 
tion of nature and spirit in Dilthey's writings. Errnarth describes Dilthey 
as an idealist inculcated >>with a considerable dose of naturalism<<. But 
more adequately, as Dilthey did not idealistically deny the natural and so创
cial exteriority of the world, others stress Dilthey's interrnediate and rn• 
diating role in these disputes. 19 Dilthey articulated what could well be de-
picted as an expansive and liberal in contrast with a cramped and illiberal 
naturalism; one that could encornpass value, validity, and the ide~ as the 
content of consciousness in accordance wi由 a scientific - and person-
oriented principle of phenomenality (Satz d，盯 Phänomenalität) in which 
nature and the world are not only neutral, impersonal, and indifferent but 
叫here-for-m归
>>The supreme principle of philosophy is the principle of phenome-
nality: according to this principle everything that exists for me is 
subject to the condition that it is a fact of my consciousness. All 
outer things, too, are only given as a connectÏon of facts or pro-
cesses of the consciousness. Objects, things , only exist for, and in, 
20 consclOusness.<< 
17 Misch 1947, 49 
18 As Austin Harrington argued, one cannot 刮目ctly assimilate Dilthey to eîther 
naturalism or the antÍ-naturalîsm of Husserl and Neo-Kantianism, see: Dilthey, 
Empathy and v告ηtehen: a Contemporary Reappraîsal. European Journal of Social 
Theory; 4.3 (2001): 311-329. Compare, however, the arguments for such a com 
mon anti-naturalism in John E. Jalbe口 Husserl's Position be阳 een Dilth可 and the 
Windelband-Rickert School o[ Neo-Kantianism. Journal of the History of Philoso 
phy, 26: 2, 1988, 279-296 
19 B.B., Li的础。古enc衍， Monatshefte der Comenius-Gesellschaft, 4-5, 1895, 126 
20 G.S. V; 90; SW!, 245-246 
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4. Nature and Spirit 
In a late short retrospective piece, his Draft for a Prφce (1911) for his 
epistemological and psychological writings , Dilthey noted that the domi-
nant positivist rnodel of the natural scienc臼 had 叫runcated the spiritual 
cultural world<< by transforming it into a rnere folk-illusion.21 This illusion 
from the persp~ctive of mere natural mater且1 relations -凹， however, 
not a groundless illusory projection but functionally real. The most reduc-
tive naturalist and rnaterialist inevitably presuppose the practices of the 
hurnan world and the enactrnent, expression, and understanding of hurn阻
life. It is this practical1ife-context that al10ws the human scientist to rec-
ognize the individual self in its so口ality and its productive creative rela-
tions with the whole of its life. 
Dilthey sceptically revealed the aporias of constitutive idealism and 
l臼 problematic intellectualist and representationalist assumptions about 
mind and reality, arguing that life is given through its phenomenality and 
yet is not merely a phenomenal appearance constituted by an empirical 
much less an ideal consciousness. Whereas only nature cornes frorn na 
ture, life in its relational tensions and living actuality is 叫here-for-m归
Life is given as a complexly mediated productive nexus that c四 form
awareness, meaning, and value for itself. This relationally emergent life is 
in need of words and the cultivation of its relational capacities for expres-
sion and articulation. As such, life is not immedi甜ly or in山tively given 
to 1臼elf. It is reflexively aware (lnn凹:verden) ， which is 叫he most sirnple 
form in which psychic life can appear".22 The simple and elemental is al 
ready ref1exi飞rely relational and mediated. That is to say, it must be under 
stood and interpreted through its expressions, objectifications, and prac-
tÍces. There is no knowledge of a world independent of perception and 
lived-曰~perience， which provide the context and actuality for the con-
sciousness of idealism and the material nature of naturalism 
The naturalizing approach to reality based on a materialistic under-
standing of the natural sciences continues to be the prevailing tendency of 
our time despite the ant卜naturalistic cal1s to re-enchant the world and the 
theological turn in some forms of recent philosophy. The anti-naturalis tÍc 
distrust of the sciences is also scrutÌnized by Dilthey in the same preface 
Dilthey maintained that it is not modern science and its successes that are 
the problern but the triurnph of a narrow conception of scientific method 
over sClence 1臼elf.
21 SW I!, 2 
22 G.S. XIX, 66; SW !, 254 
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Despite positivism' s limitations and dogmatic overextension, and 出us
also of the naturalistic worldview when it becomes a problematic meta-
physical doctrine about the totality of the world, Dilthey articulated the 
basic empirical dynamic of knowledge while rejecting positivism's specu-
latÏve opponents , >>who tore thought away from sense-perception<.♂ Ac 
cording to Di1they, both positivism and KantÏan inspired critical em户口
口sm are correct to stress both experience and its limits, since the natural 
阻d historical empirical conditions and contexts of life cannot be tran-
scended even as further articulation and evaluation pushes individuals be-
yond the factuality of their real conditions. 
In contrast to the one-sided reduction of life to biological and 
physiological instincts, drives , and the senses that are i臼 natural basis or 
to the actÏvity of a non-sensuous spirit or constitutive consciousness, 
Dilthey proposed a suggestive alternative strategy to both: to 吨nderstand
life on i臼 own terms<<, immanently interpreting it from out of itseIf 
vrithout eliminating its fullness for the sake of one of its elements - and 
bring it through its felt reflexivity (Inneweγde时， methodological interpre-
tation and inquiry，扭d self-reflection (Selbstbesinnung) to re f1ective cog-
nitÏon and validity about itself. 24 To this extent, science (Wissenschaft) Ìs 
not excluded or demeaned，剖 Dilthey's scientistic critics maintain, as it 
plays a central role - along with art and ethics - in the formation 
(Bildung) and self-ref1ectiveness of modern individuals in relation to the 
contingency of natural forces and social conditions.25 
Dilthey remarked almost twenty years earlier in Life and Cognition 
(1892-1893) that 叫hought ， which sets out to u!timately comprehend the 
universe, is bound to the transient existence of organic life. Thought is ex-
tremely fragile; it appears only at isolated poin臼 in organic life and as 
such only at intervals as a temporarγfunctÏon. Everywhere it appears as a 
part of life and in its service 产 In this signific阻t text, Di!they is clearly 
pursuing a naturalistic strategy insofar as he analyzes how all things 
emerge from contingent natural conditÎons and circumstances and the 
common bodily sensuous schema of animal and human life. As evident in 
the previous quote, thought strives to universalize itself and the person to 
individuate herself in the context of these conditions. This universalizing 
from out of the facticity and finitude of one' s situation and milieu is pos-
sible because of the pre-conceptual felt self-reflexivity (Innewerden) and 
23 SW 1I. 2 
24 SW lI, 2 
25 Compare E.S. Nelson: Disturbing Tru的 Art， Finitude, and the Hi耐旧n Scien c.ιm 
Dilthey. theory@buffalo: Interdisciplinary Journal of the Humanities, 11, 2007, 
121-142 
26 SW II, 345 
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the intensified self-reflectiveness (Selbst.古esinnung) in which life turns 
back on itself and through which life becomes aware of itself, articulating 
itself as a life." 
The individuation and cultivation of a self occurs through an imma-
nent intercrossing movement, encompassing the natural-biological as well 
as the social-historical, toward the possibility of the ideal and potentially 
even the religious. It is here that the ethical, the individual other worthy 
of respect, becomes visible within the context of the world and society 
Dilthey described this process of the becoming of knowledge as 吨 real
natural epistemology<<. It requires an expansive conception of naturalness, 
without doctrinal naturalism's confinernent of the phenornena, in contrast 
with its reductive and eliminative forms. 
5. Becoming a Self 
Dilthey did not conclude his ar伊rnentation with the assertion of natural 
ness in this exp阻ded sense. Dilthey critically traced the boundaries of 
natural scientific methods in the face of the felt reflexivi ty of the subject 
(Innewerden) , the singular nexus of the individual's life (Individuation) , 
and the inability of humans to know and comprehend life as a compre-
hensive universally valid systematic whole. Beginning with naturalism 剖 a
general point of departure in his writings of the 1890's, Di!they imman 
ently demonstrated its possibilities and limits in the context of the psy 
chological, historical, and ethicallife of individuals while declining to ap 
peal to essentialist, religious , or metaphysical conceptions of a 
substantialized self 
Dilthey's wider project extends beyond the theory of knowledge as it 
is shaped by the concern for recognizing and valuing an ethical individual 
seIf vrithin the context of the natural and social-historical determinants 
that appear to undermine the identity of such a self. Dilthey does not so 
much posit a self as an atom of analysis outside the social, as Simmel 
charges. Simmel dismantled this individuali巧; which for Dilthey is not 
merelya theoretical thesis but a practical vocatÏon, as an undigested rem-
nant resisting full social me刮目ion. There 凹， however, no unmediated in-
dividual in Dilthey. He revealed instead how the self is expressed and cul-
tivated only within and through the immanent structures and conditions 
of social-historical life. The individual self can establish itself and other 
27 See E.S. Nelson: Self-Reflection， In阳pretatzon， 耐ld Historical Life in Dilt品可， m
H.-U. Lessing, R.A. Makkreel und R. Pozzo (eds.) , Recent Contributions to 
Dilthey's Philo呻妙。if the Human Sc.阳ces. Stuttgart: Frommann-holzboog，却11 ，
105-134 
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se1v臼剖 a universal value only in and through this nexus, as an intersec-
tional point of crisscrossing forces that extend beyond it 
It is Dilthey's practical ethical orientation that ultimately constitutes 
the genuine turning point from 出e natura1 to the human world. This 
盯ansition from nature to spirit also has its epistemic conditions. While 
Dilthey naturalistically critiques claims appealing to a non-interpreted 
immediate givenness and the direct self-access and seH也evidence of an 
unmediated >>Înner experience<:< or an unrnediated sensuous perception, 
which lead to problematic transcendent clairns about reality as a systemω 
atic totality, Dilthey critically - if minimalistically due to his reinterpreta 
tion of transcendental categori臼剖 conditiona1 embodied life-categories 
confronts naturalisrn with the reflexively and interpretively processed and 
mediated character of the given and the factical. Since facticity and given-
ness rnust be 出ere-for-me (that is, there for a seH) and since 1ived-
experiences are cornplex relatìonal wholes invol飞ring purpos1veness, 
Dilthey concludes that they cannot be coherently and adequately reduced 
to or reconstructed as discrete >>natural<< elements abstracted frorn the 
comp1ex life-nexus. A1though naturalism is generally the primaty orienta 
tion of all rnodern science and Îs the rnost basic of worldviews in his Welt 
an5chauungsleh刊， it is the contents of life and the objects themselves that 
call us to methodo1ogica1 p1ura1ism and articu1ate rea1ity in more multifac-
eted and nuanced ways 
6. Between Nature and Spirit: 
The Mediating Ro1e of Psycho1ogy 
Di1they reinterprets epistemo1ogy as having a socia1, psycho1ogica1, and 
biological dimension that cannot be eliminated without distorting the ac 
tivÌti田， processes , and tasks of cognitÌve knowledge (Eγkenntni5) in the 
context of a盯r口tlcl
mumcatl盯1凹ve understanding. Di过lthe叮y challenges metaphysical and sc口len皿t1S t1C
for口rr口m丑na址1is盯m丑旧1四s t出hat int臼e盯r叩pret know1edge to c∞on旧sist of 吼wo町rld1es臼s v咀alidit叮yand
value claims. The sense of actuality is not a product of Ìntellectual posit-
ingj it is shaped by the interaction of cognition with feeling , instincts , and 
volitions that develop as a complex whole in a person through experiences 
of resistance，且m拭目ion， and restraÌnt. 
The Origin of 0阳 Belief in the Reali.可 of如 E阳阳1 World and 1 t5 
Justi卢cation (1890) shows how rea1ity is neither a representationally con 
structed phenomenal object nor an immediately given in Ìntuition or inner 
experience. Reality as 叫here for me<< is exhibited as immediate in empiri-
cal consciousness through felt reflexive awareness (Inneweγden). This ap-
parent immediacy is rnediated through biological drives , environmental 
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adaptations, and practica1 interests formed through the p1ay and work of 
impulse and resistance. Our sense of reality presupposes the elemental in-
teraction and rnediation of self and world prior to their differentiationj re-
ality is irreducible to a worldless subject or an unperc白ved and non-given 
object, to pure consciousn臼s or rnater皿1ity， much 1ess to their metaphysi 
cally reified rnanifestation as idealisrn and rnaterialisrn 
Di1they's phi1osophica1 and psycho1ogica1 writings from the 1890's, 
are representative of a highly productive and controversial period in the 
deve10pment of his thought. Dilthey's endeavors to give both naturalistic 
and hurnanistic strategies their due regard and reconceive epistemology 
through the methods and data of the sciences, particu1arly history and 
psycho1ogy; 1ed to the negative reaction of both positivists and idealists 
No aspect of his thought was rnore provocative than his advocacy of a de 
scnpt凹e and analytic psychology as a >>hurnan science<< (Geistl白wzssen
schaft) , which w剖 opposed by those who considered psycho1ogy an excll卜
sively naturalis tÎc experirnental science, including pioneering experimental 
psycho1ogists such 剖 Ebbinghaus and Wundt who pursued reductionist 
programs that uprooted individuals from their environing world and so-
cial existence. Dilthey's critÌcs also included Neo-Kantian philosophers 
Windelband and Rickert in particu1ar protected the distinctiveness of the 
>>cultural sciences飞 as sciences of individual persons and ideal values, frorn 
naturalism by abandoning psycho1ogy to the universa1izing hypothetica1-
causal explanations of the natural sciences. 
These early debates continue to haunt later reflections On the possi-
bi1ity of a humanistic or interpretive psycho1ogy. Diltheγs con町ibutions
to these phi1osophica1 and psycho1ogica1 disputes over the actuality of the 
self and its experiences of the world are worth reconsidering for their his 
torical significance, and - given the increasing albeit still too lirnited ap 
preciation for the social, historical, cultural, and aesthetic dimensions of 
psychological inquiry - because we are perhaps in a better positÌon today 
to recognÌze the continuing relevance of Dilthey's contextualizing epis-
temology and individual-oriented interpretive psychology.28 
The Idea5 for a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology (1894), Dilthey's 
most controversial work, raised the ire of both positivistic psychology 
(Ebbinghaus and Wundt) and phi1osophers committed to a transcendenta1 
rea1m of va1idity and va1ue claims (Rickert and early Husserl). Di1they ar 
ticu1ates - through a comp1ex and nuanced reading of the psycho1ogica1 
1iterature of his times - the possibi1ity of a descriptive and ana1ytic (that 
is , an interpretive) psychology. Dilthey does not argue for an opposition 
28 1 discuss the impure and plural character of D过they's psychology further in 
E.S. Nelson: lmpuγe Phenomenology: Dilthey, Epistemology, and lnte甲rettτ e Psy-
chology. Studia Phaenomenologica 1 口， 2010， 19-44
153 
Eric S. N elson 
of rnethods - understanding and explanation - and a duality of sciences 
natural and hurnan - as sirnplistic depictions of Dilthey's thinking incor-
rec句 clairn ， Diltl町 does not advocate abandoni叫E
臼u山sa址l ne旺xu旧s of r町eal町 he re口1Ïnds his readers that 卢echanical and effi-
cient causal explanation in the natural sciences construct an abstract 
causal nexus linked by hypotheses and separated from the dense bonds 
and thick relations of the effective nexus (WirkungszI在sammenhanl!.) of life. 
In kins 
stuaZn1dd1ng, relat1011s of meanmg and causal reiatIons aremutually entangled 
Ne1ther onc dssolves the efhclent causal and COIldmIonal nature of sum-
tifically eXplainable reality. Nowhere is the connectedness of meaning and 
causal叼 more 盯gn出cant 山n in the human sciences themselves. As a 
consequence, Dilthey did not reduce hurnan scientific inquiry to pure in-
terpreuve understandmg D1lthey utlHzed both effiqent CAusal explana 
tion and interpretive understandi吨 in his psychology as well as other 
human sctnt11C Stratepes such as fLIneuonal and sEructurai explananon 
of social 且ld cultural systerns 
Dilthey did not discard causality; he critiqued the rnisuses and abuses 
of causalltymthe reductIVc emp1rleal expenmentai psychology and sqen-
tisrn of his time for the sake of genuine scientific inquiry. It is interesting 
to note that Misch 战ntified Hurne 剖 an irnportant source for Dilth町';
historical project. As with Hume's rnoderate a叫 l且ife-n肘ex旧 onen盯 t忧ed s阻ce卢D 
t1C口IS盯r叽X
P且y归SI皿cs and radωlca址l va盯r口le时t1阻es of scepti旧lC口1阻sm， Dilthey sceptically interrogated 
the POSSEbiHty of fathommg causal connect1ons to achIeve cert且ntv-or
rne呻hysical truth, whether this is rnaterialist or ideal叽 while articulat-
ing the social reproduction and transforrnation of meaning and knowlede:e 
within the contexts of the da剖il忖yc∞omrr口1Ufl1阻ca剖tlve p阻肌ct旧臼 of ordin盯 l旧I证fe斗.J;9
As opp。于d to justifying the sciences through a questioI呻le appeal to the 
盯transcen今阳n趾t 0时r
S皿Cl阻ences by s且ce叩pticall抄y aba阻ndoni丑I皿z且19 exaggerated kno耿W训rledge cla剖1m虹ms and 
由山rough the an时叫th巾ropol沁O吕♂lCa址l and histori川cal c∞On盯te旺x盯t阳l
ences.3C 
29 On Dilthey's mo~e-:ate empirically orie_nted s~epticism， see E.S. Nelson: Empiri 
c!>叫 Factic叩" and the Immanenι e 01 L松的 Dilthey. P叮: Warwick Journal of Ph卜
losophy 18, 20口7， 108-128
30 This reading runs contra可 to F.c. Beiser's account in The German Historicist Tra 
dition. Oxford University Pre阻， 2012， 433; Di1they is not concerned with answer 
1ngthemdIUl seepucbyappealingto a dub1ous flcuon thatpurpoztedly tran 
tt1e natural and Nstoneal world, as the separauon of ep1stemology from the C Dndi 
tions of life abandons the most fundamental questio~ns of kno-;'ledge. Beiser ac-
cordingly misses the historical complexi可 of Dilthey's position in dismissing 
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Given the rnediatÏon involved in concrete individuallife, psychology can-
not be appropriately understood as a subjective self-Íntuition and intro-
spection. This approach denies the facticity of life and rnind, as mediated 
phenomena dernanding interpretation，皿d undermines psychology's sci 
entific - i.e. , intersubjec盯e and UI山ersalizing - task. Nor can psychology 
be adequate 10 its task of illurninating individual human life if it is the col 
lecting of discrete data - abstracted from and dissolving the life-nexus of 
individual and sociallife - that are then externally reconstructed and or-
ganized through causal hypotheses 
Objecti々íng third-person rnethods are useful in every science but 
should be contextualized in a hurnan-oriented psychology that recognizes 
the conditional, negotiated, and fragile unity and identity of the individual 
person and the person's interpretive, rnediated, and selιreflexive life. Be 
cause of the multifaceted mediation of the >>acquired psychic nexus<<, 
which as structured contrasts with an atomistic bundle of elements and as 
acquired differs from the vision of an innate intrinsic self, psychology 
cannot be merely descriptive but must also be analytic, cornparative, and 
structural. Structural psychology reveals the ternporal enactment of the 
categories of life in lived-experience and provides additional support for 
his reinterpretation of epistemology and the hurnan sciences in contrast 
with movernents that exclude empirical psychology frorn these roles. 
Dilthey did not abandon this psychological prograrn even as it be-
carne more deeply hermeneutical in his later works. Contributions to the 
5阳dy o[ h功vidualiη(1895-96) further articulates the comparative-
morphological strategy of elucidating individuality in its relational con-
texts. Through the hermeneutical oscillation between singular and whole, 
both are further elucidated. Di!they rejected the N eo-Kantian paradigm of 
the ideographic character of the cu!tural sciences developed in Windel-
band. Dilthey right!y illustrated how (1) natural sciences such as astron-
omy encompass an ideographic dimension and (2) the human scienc臼
presuppose and propose generalizing and systematizing clairns that allow 
the effective life-nexus to be interpreted through the typical and the sin-
gular. It is in this natural-historical context that the actual and not merely 
ideal individual can be recognized and respected. The world overflows the 
individual according to Dilthey: 
>>The infinite richness of life unfolds itself in individual existence 
because of its relations to its milieu, other humans and things. But 
Dtith町's critique of abstract intellectualistic theories of knowledge and the posi-
tive epistemic role for science and life of the critique of historical reason 
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every particular indîvidual is also a crossing point of contexts 
which move through and beyond its particular life.((31 
N onetheless, the conditional and situated yet sti11 meaningful and pur 
poswemdmdual:personIS the baSEc pomt of departure and task for the 
human sciences and of Dilthey's hermeneutical justification of methodo-
logical individualism against the collectivist tendencies dominant in Ger-
man philosophy and social the。可
Dilthey's methodological individualism differs from other varieti臼
because it g四sps the individual as a contextual historical realirv rather 
than as a Hobbesian fictÍon and allows for the use of soc皿1 conc二 pts. 50 
cial realities such 剖 the state, society，扭d community are given in experi 
ence and need to be mterpreted m order to understand SOCIal l1fe Tile1r 
experiential givenness does not justify positing them as independent 
m山h less metaphysical realities. Dilthey's critique of reified notions such 
as the spirit of the people (\1(口lksgeist) and community (Gelηeinscha仕) for 
the sake of 由 relational yet sti且 distinctive individ山1， which was refor-
mulated by Plessner against its poisonous fascistic forms in The Limits o[ 
Communi吵， proved to be prescient 
7. NaturaIly Interpreting Persons? 
Dilthey's philosophy of the hurnan sciences appears anti~naturalistic from 
the perspective of an impoverishing and reifîed monistîc naturalism 
Dîlthey's naturalism is such that the appropriate recognitîon of each ob-
)ectmd class of objects Calis for recogmuon ItHmethodologeally plu』
raiuuc rather than ontologically momsuc and zs opposed to the m1nimal-
istic desert-producing logicistic naturalism of philosophers such as Quine. 
From a Quinean eliminative viewpoint, Dilthey would app臼r no doubt 
even more dogmatically em户口cal in his defense of the unrestricted and 
unprejudiced empirical inqu町 (>>unbφngene E呻旷的) against empîri 
cum and more laxly lenlent and baroque than CarnapBs-from Qume's 
perspective - overly tolerant logical positivism 
Dilthey's critique of metaphysics places transcendent objects into 
suspicion as being beyond the limits of cognitive knowledge. This critique 
does not extend to phenomenal objects given in experience, all of which 
(natural and human) are mediated. The mediation of each object does not 
entail a reduction to isolated elements that suppresses their sense and sig-
nificance. It 叫uires that they be describ叫 analyzed，叫 mv削ga时乌
theÍr own way 田 wholes. Although a11 sci巳nces are expressions of life, 
31 G.S. VII, 134-135 
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which cannot escape 1证矿s conditions, the human sciences are immanently 
constituted in intersubjective relations hy practical and ultimately ethical 
and social-political interests m a way that distinguishes them from the 
natural sciences that rest more securely in the objectified world 
Dilthey's expansive naturalism prefigures the philosophical anthro 
pology of Misch and Plessner. This more contextualized, nuanced, and 
tolerant form of naturalism proceeds from the natural-biological and an-
thropological conditions of human life through their social~historical con~ 
figurations to their unique intersection and crossing in the life, self-
reflectÏon, and individuation of a conditional yet meaningful and pur-
posive nexus that can be designated an individual person 
Heidegger construed, problematically in my estimatÍon, Dilthey's 
project as a flawed anti-naturalist personalism and consequently a failed 
phenomenology which gave the natural point of view and the sciences too 
much purchase.32 Dilthey's works are an ambiguous source for the new 
phenomenology, as Husserl noted in his defensive and polemical justifica-
tion of the primacy of an absolute science rising against all natural, an-
thropological-psychological, and social-historical conditions and contexts. 
Given their common sources in the descriptive and analytic empiricist 
philosophy of Trendelenburg, who was a determining influence on Dil 
they and Brentano, Dilthey could appreciate the description of the emer 
gence of higher forms of understanding, meaning, and validity described 
in Husserl's Logical lnvestigations and i臼 tendency toward a realist 
worldly referentiality. Husserl, 5cheler, Heidegger learned from Dilthey's 
personalist psychology or his depiction of an immanent self-interpreting 
affective, worldly, and historicallife. 33 
Dilthey's thought is incompatible with the transcendental~ontologi叩
cal turn in philosophy that occurred in Neo-Kantianism and phenome-
nology二 Dilthey is not an antÌ-naturalistic thinker, did not advocate a 
bracketing of the natural and the objective for the sake of a pure p且e
nomenological startmg point that is independent of the social-historical 
life-nexus, and would not attempt to replace metaphysics - placed in 
doubt by cultural-historical and epistemic-reflective critique and revealed 
to be more affective and individual than cognitive and universal - with a 
new fundamental transcendental~ontological philosophy. 
Philosophy should become a less pretentious and more modest criti-
cal reflectiveness (Besinnung) that cannot abandon its close relations with 
the natural and human sciences or with cultural life. The rnultiplicity of 
32 M. Heidegger, History of the Concept of 刀m巳 Prol喀omena. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1985, GA 20, 161 
33 Compare Heidegger, GA 20, 161; E. von Aster, Die Philosophie der Gegenwart 
Leiden: A.W Sijtho缸， 1935 ， 149， 155
157 
Eric S. Nelson 
ways of life and worldviews is in this context irrevocable.34 The intercon 
textuality 01 human lile and the value 01 individual personality are articu-
lated through interdisciplinary human s口entific research. As Ernst von 
Aster noted, metaphysics is abandoned in Di!they lor ph过osophical an-
thropology and universal historyJS 
As Aster and Misch argue, a philosophical reflection that inlorms and 
is informed by the human sciences and modestly remains within the im 
manence 01 nature and lile is incompatible with the rehabili归tion 01 the 
metaphysical, theological, and transcendent in the phenomenology 01 the 
1920's 36 Misch describes how the anti-metaphysical critical philosophies 
01 Kant and Di!they direct us back to empirical lile and its problems, 
while the new "lile-philosophical" ontology departs Irom that lile to re-
turn to the metaphysicalY Dilthey's advocacy 01 the antimetaphysical 
legacy of the Enlightenment and critical-positivist prioritization of ex 
perience and the experiential sciences are sources of resistance to the new 
poτvers of authoritarianism and re咱enchantment.38
8. Feeling and Nature in Dilthey's Aesthetics 
Dilthey's aesthetics provides a distinct yet related example 01 Dilthey's 
resistance to enchantment and his critical appreci盯ion of naturalism and 
modern且其 one which can only be briefly sketched here. Dilthey's ap-
proach to art has been portrayed as a continuation of Romanticism that 
due to the emphasis on feeling, imagination, and the free responsiveness 
01 the subject - is incompatible with the realism and naturalism 01 the 
second hall 01 the 19th-centu巧瓦 But in his aesthetic writings, particularly 
The Three Epochs of Modem Aesthetics and lts Present Task (1892) , Dilthey 
emerged as a more s严卫pathetic and complex aesthetic theorist who criti-
cized the limitations while articulating the significance and possibilities of 
literary realism and naturalism - e.g. modern artistic articulations of the 
naturalistic feeling 01 lile … against their Neo-Romantic detractors and the 
emergence of symbo且st spiritualism and its visionary enthusiasm 
34 On Dilthey's plural approach to worldviews, and Heîdegger's ontologically monis 
tÎc critÎcÎsm of Dilthey's >ontic pluralism勾 see E5. Nelson: The World Pict阳"e and 
its Conflict in Dilthey and HeideggeχHumana Mente: J ournal of Philosophical 
Studies 18, 2011 , 19-38 
35 E. v. Aster 1935, 51-52, 103 
36 E. v. Aster 1935, 103-104 
37 G. Misch, Lebensphilosophie und Phã'nomenologie: Eine Auseinandersetzung der 
Diltheyschen Richtung mit Heidegger und Husserl. Stuttgart: Teubn町'， 1967， 281
282 
38 Misch 1967, 281一282
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The power 01 realism lor Dilthey lies in how it critically reveals the dis-
crepancy between outer appear扭ce and internal reality, even as its weak-
ness is its inability to reflectively generalize and interpretively focus on 
what is essential to evoking and heightening the "Ieeling 01 life" (Lebens 
gefühl). Rather than rejecting naturalism and direct!y delending Romantic 
aesthetics, naturalism is understood as achieving i臼 truth when it not only 
copies and reproduces but elucidates, intens出es ， and transforms the life 
that it portrays. Di!they reinterprets realism through the tension 01 reality 
and feeling, resistance and will, and the objectivities of social life and 
lived-experience 01 the individual. 
The naturalism of social novels - such as those of Dickens, Balzac, 
and Zola - is the emergence of a new style and sensibility appropriate for 
the modern technological conditions of life that has not yet achieved a 
>>new inner form<< for the work of art in relation to the subjectivity of the 
artist and audience. Dilthey consequently reinterprets both romanticism 
and realism as revealing two sides of the tensions of reality and feeling, re-
sistance and will, and the objectivities of sociallife in the context of indi 
viduallived-experience (Eγlebnis) 
Life-philosophically and hermeneutically interpreted, the artistic ten 
dencies of realism and naturalism prove to be one-sided and incomplete 
steps in contrast to the more expansive and liberal unfolding of naturalism 
in writers such as Goethe. Dilthey not only emphasized the naturalistic 
dimensions of Goethe and Schleiermacher but relied on these to formu-
late his objections to narrow naturalism. Nonetheless, despite his criti 
cisms, literary naturalism and realism are more aesthetically prornising for 
the >>present task of aestheticμthan the abandonment of the tension be 
tween reality and leeling in a literature that one-sidedly and unreflectively 
embraces organic vitality, intuitive vision, and irrational feeling 
Di!they's critical evah川ion of radical subjectivism in a臼theti臼 1S an 
example of his wider 油ermeneutical empiricist<< strategy of critiquing and 
contextualizing idealist epistemology by situating knowledge in the so 
cial-historical, psychological, and natural conditions 01 life. To this extent, 
Dilthey is at best an ambiguous heir to Romanticism and much more of a 
critic of its late-19th century pathologies 
9. Dilthey's Legacy 
Dilthey's he盯r口m口时lene阳uticall扣eg伊ac巧y onl:妙y pa町r口t句 resonaιte臼S 皿 thínkers such as 
Heidegger and Scheler, who did not lurther articulate the emergence and 
dífferentiation of the human immanently from w比hin the natural. Hei 
degger and Scheler rehabilitate in their own ways - and in distinction 
Irom Di!they's historical anthropological approach to human lile - the 
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dignity of the ontological and the transcendent over against animal and 
organic life 
Heidegger excluded the discourses of the natural and human sciences 
as ontic from the tasks of a fundamental ontology. Heidegger did not re-
cognize or allow for the basic role that Dilthey gave the particular sci-
ences in interdisciplinary reflection and philosophy itself. Scheler adopted 
the mystical core of >>life-philosophy<< and the personalism of interpretive 
psychology in order to rehabilitate the metaphysical and theological char 
acter of values. Scheler not only rejected >>biologisrn<< but the mediated an 
thropologies of Dilthey and pragmatism as overly naturalizing, advocating 
instead an anti-naturalistÎc philosophical anthropology that maintained a 
radical difference in essence between anirnals and the rnetaphysical reli-
gious animal. 39 
The inheritance of transcendental philosophy in both i臼 Neo-Kan­
tian and phenomenological forms appears as an unbridgeable abyss bet-
ween nature and spirit, the animal and the human. It was not in Heidegger 
or Scheler's phenornenology but, as discussed in other contrÎbutions to 
this volume , in Plessner's bio-hermeneutical anthropology that the medi卢
ated character of nature and spirit continues to be analyzed. Echoing 
Dilthey's articulation of the self in the midst of the forces and conditions 
of natural and historical life, Plessner corrected the partiality of both 
naturalism and an anti-naturalistic personalism by forcefully elucidating 
their inner coherence in the emergence of a relational self. The naturally 
eccentric and artificial constructive anirnal called human occurs in the 
midst of life. 
39 E. v. Aster 1935, 103-104. 
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